REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		Form Approved OMB NO. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 16-02-2016	2. REPORT TYPE Conference Proceeding	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) -

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Does Everyday Corruption Affect How Russians View their Political Leadership?	W911NF-14-1-0541
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 611102

6. AUTHORS	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
William M. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya, Vicki L. Hesli Claypool	
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES AND ADDRESSES	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
University of Iowa @ Iowa City 2 Gilmore Hall Iowa City, IA 52242 -1320	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS (ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) ARO
U.S. Army Research Office P.O. Box 12211 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2211	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 65649-LS.1

12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILIBILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views, opinions and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not contrued as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.

14. ABSTRACT

Analyzing unique survey data gathered in the summer of 2015 from Russia, we are able to trace the links between personal corrupt behavior and political attitudes. We show that participation in everyday corruption lowers a person's support for the political regime, both as a bivariate relationship and in a multivariate model with controls. Everyday interactions that citizens have with bureaucrats help form those citizens' views about something far removed from most citizens' lives: the country's political leadership. In Russia, those who frequently encounter corruption are less, not more, happy with the regime. Street-level corruption is corrosive of the body politic. Our

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Russia corruption legitimacy regime public opinion

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	15. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON William Reisinger
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU	UU		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER 319-335-2351

Standard Form 298 (Rev 8/98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

Report Title

Does Everyday Corruption Affect How Russians View their Political Leadership?

ABSTRACT

Analyzing unique survey data gathered in the summer of 2015 from Russia, we are able to trace the links between personal corrupt behavior and political attitudes. We show that participation in everyday corruption lowers a person's support for the political regime, both as a bivariate relationship and in a multivariate model with controls. Everyday interactions that citizens have with bureaucrats help form those citizens' views about something far removed from most citizens' lives: the country's political leadership. In Russia, those who frequently encounter corruption are less, not more, happy with the regime. Street-level corruption is corrosive of the body politic. Our results, thus, are an important step towards resolving a long-standing debate among those who study corruption.

Conference Name: Trends in Russian Public Opinion Under Putin: New Findings

Conference Date: February 22, 2016

Does Everyday Corruption Affect How Russians View their Political Leadership?[1]
William M. Reisinger, Marina Zaloznaya and Vicki L. Hesli Claypool, University of Iowa
Presented at George Washington University, February 22, 2016.

To the extent that Russian President Vladimir Putin heads a highly personalized authoritarian political regime, understanding why Russians give or withhold their approval for him and his lieutenants is revealing of the stability of the regime. Debate therefore continues about the sources of Russians' support for their political leaders, particularly Putin's high job-approval ratings.[2] Strong empirical evidence shows that, at least until recently, the state of Russia's national economy pushed leadership approval up or down, as it does in most countries (Rose, Mishler and Munro 2011; Treisman 2011, 2014). At present, though, oil prices have collapsed, wage arrears have recommenced, inflation is high, pensions endangered, and many desired goods are unavailable, yet approval ratings are declining only somewhat if at all. To some observers, public approval is "sticky" due to the regime's smart use of Russian identity symbols via Kremlin-controlled media (Shlapentokh 2011). Most critically over the past several years, the 2014 annexation of Crimea played to Russians' imperial nostalgia and longing to be a great power (Laruelle 2014; Babayan 2015; Laruelle 2016). This "Russians are hoodwinked" explanation, though, is certainly overstated and is unlikely to be useful beyond a limited period.

Against the backdrop of debate over such "macro" factors, we should look for explanations that bring out differences within the society--the "micro" level. Russian citizens are likely to base their support for political leaders in part on how positive or negative their everyday life experiences are. Among such experiences, we expect dealings with officialdom to be of importance. These dealings directly link citizens' personal or family situations with the state or social order. Of particular interest should be encounters that involve corruption or the potential for it. We therefore ask a question not previously addressed in the Russian context: Do Russians' personal experiences with corruption influence how they evaluate their political leaders and, if so, in what direction? In addressing this question, we focus specifically on small-scale corruption, such as bribery exchanges in everyday encounters between individuals and employees of service-provision organizations. We refer to this as "bureaucratic corruption."

[2]Some observers question the validity of the reported ratings in light of the heightened repression of recent years. Yet, as Frye et al. (2015) have shown, list experiments, which allow respondents to indicate their opinion without the interviewer knowing what it is, bear out the high level of support.

Analyzing unique survey data gathered in the summer of 2015 from Russia, we are able to trace the links between personal corrupt behavior and political attitudes. We show that participation in everyday corruption lowers a person's support for the political regime, both as a bivariate relationship and in a multivariate model with controls. Everyday interactions that citizens have with bureaucrats help form those citizens' views about something far removed from most citizens' lives: the country's political leadership. While the direct link between engagement in everyday corruption and political support is modest, its substantive impact is larger through two *indirect* mechanisms. First, Russians who experienced more bureaucratic corruption over the preceding year think the political establishment is more corrupt, which in turn plays a major role in shaping support for the regime. Second, Russians who experienced more bureaucratic corruption came away from these encounters with dimmer views of the officials they dealt with. These dimmer views in turn lower their views of how Russia's leaders are performing. Their judgments about leadership performance strongly shapes regime support.

We begin by explaining how we understand bureaucratic corruption and how it connects to support for the political regime. We then explore how bureaucratic corruption and support for the regime vary across key social groups in Russia. We concluding by exploring the relationship between Russians' recent experiences with low-level corruption and their attitudes towards the political system, explaining both the direct and indirect paths by which corruption experiences have their impact.

Bureaucratic Corruption and Regime Support

Our focus is on *bureaucratic corruption*: everyday encounters between bureaucrats and citizens in which informal negotiations and illicit exchanges take a variety of forms: under-the-table payments, gifts and favors that citizens provide to bureaucrats in exchange for performing their job-related duties or extending additional, extralegal benefits to their clients (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000; Humphrey 2000; Jain 2001, 75; Karklins 2005; Holmes 2006; Osipian 2008, 2009; Zaloznaya 2012b). Petty bribes, presents, and favors can be extorted by service-providers or offered voluntarily by their clients. Such corruption directly confronts most people and has been shown to be a commonplace part of daily life for many post-Soviet citizens (Varese 2000; Karklins 2005, 3; Polese 2008; Round, Williams and Rodgers 2008b; Rimskii 2013). It occurs in a variety of public and private organizational settings, such as hospitals and clinics (Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001; Rivkin-Fish 2005), universities and secondary schools (Osipian 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012; Zaloznaya 2012b), police and traffic police control posts (Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Polese 2008; McCarthy, Frye and Buckley 2015), and private firms

(Round, Williams and Rodgers 2008a). We use petty, street-level, everyday or low-level corruption as synonyms of bureaucratic corruption.

We depart from most prior investigations that link corruption with regime support; they examine whether the public thinks politicians and officials are corrupt. These studies document in a variety of settings (as will we below) that perceptions of elite corruption correlate with lower levels of trust in or support for regimes (Manzetti and Wilson 2006; Chong et al. 2011; Linde 2012; Chaisty and Whitefield 2013; Klašnja and Tucker 2013). In other words, people who believe that politicians are crooked and self-serving are likely to withdraw their support. But what happens when people themselves are engaged in corruption, possibly with beneficial outcomes? Does it affect their attitudes toward the regime? If so, do they become accomplices of the regime or, on the contrary, do they resent the regime for putting them into corruption-conducive circumstances? Only Seligson (2002) and Tavits (2010) have yet tackled these issues, in Latin America and Estonia, respectively. But further work is needed, both because the two studies reach different conclusions and to include a wider range of societies.

When we refer to regime support, we mean what Norris (2011) calls "support for regime principles," the second-most diffuse form of support in her recasting of Easton's (1965) treatment of political legitimacy. For non-democratic regimes, however, it is harder than for democracies to separate principles from the regime's leaders and top institutions. At present, most scholars concur that Russia's regime is fully (hegemonic) authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2010; Gelman 2014, 518). Of course, managed elections continue. They play an important role, including as plebiscites on the regime's popularity (Hanson 2011). Still, Russia better fits Brooker's (2013, 8-12) description of a "democratically disguised authoritarian regime" than that of a hybrid. Freedom House (2015) gives Russia the second-lowest score of 6 on both political rights and civil liberties.

Also noteworthy about contemporary Russian politics is the extent of Putin's personal role. Those who classify authoritarian regimes by type of rule--rather than extent of authoritarianism--judge Russia to be a personalist autocracy (Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014). Although the party United Russia plays an important role in organizing elections, it cannot constrain Putin (Roberts 2012). The regime's personalism has increased in recent years, as the role of formal institutions in policymaking has declined and a narrowing circle of elites is allowed input into decisions (Gaaze 2014; Melville and Mironyuk 2015; Baturo and Elkink 2016). Given this, we operationalize regime support to incorporate orientations toward top leaders and institutions. At the same time, we follow Norris and others in distinguishing citizens' level of support for the regime from how they evaluate the regime's performance.

That Russia has an authoritarian regime enhances the possibility that everyday corruption matters for the regime's support. In countries with authoritarian regimes, "clarity of responsibility" is high but channels for changing the leaders are few. The literature on clarity of responsibility began with comparisons among democracies (Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1998; Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka 2002). Yet its logic applies in non-democratic settings as well: when a regime's institutions make clear which set of leaders is responsible for policies, the public can more easily blame those leaders when things go badly. Authoritarian regimes will generally have quite clear responsibility, personalist ones in particular. At the same time, non-democracies lack--or provide weakened versions of--channels for the public to express dissatisfaction and potentially change leaders. As a result, corruption's challenge to regime stability may be higher than in democracies.

How Might Engagement in Bureaucratic Corruption Alter Regime Support?

We argue that Russians whose daily affairs bring them into situations of corruption will tend to hold lower views of their political leadership than others. Past work on corruption provides several mechanisms through which this can operate. Before explaining those mechanisms, however, we need to note that this expectation is opposed by two rival perspectives: those who argue that engagement in petty corruption should have little or no effect on people's judgments and those who propose that this engagement may promote better views of the country's rulers.

A recurrent theme in the literature on corruption in Eastern Europe is that it has long been "normalized" (e.g., Ledeneva 1998; Rimskii 2013). From *blat* (in-kind, delayed-reciprocity exchanges), which was widespread during the Soviet era, to immediate monetary transactions, common in the present day, bureaucratic corruption has been an integral, embedded part of life for the region's population for many decades. People therefore may not see engaging in petty corruption as deviant, despite national campaigns against higher-level corruption.

The second group provide several reasons why corruption engagement might enhance attitudes toward a country's political leaders. First, it may make the person involved feel economically better off. Utilizing informal mechanisms of achievement may create a sense of personal resourcefulness and therefore more economic security. Second, the ability to give bribes, in and of itself, may indicate a certain economic status: only people with some disposable income have the ability to partake in corruption as givers (Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001; Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 2003; Jong-Sung and Khagram 2005; Dincer and Gunalp 2012). Since, generally speaking, those better off financially will be more positive about the political system, corruption may be associated with higher regime support.

Third, if people participate in corruption, they may well have more positive interactions with

bureaucracies, getting what they need from officials or getting it more promptly, and therefore have higher satisfaction with the regime. A long line of theorists has portrayed corruption as "grease" in the wheels of ineffective organizations (Key 1949; Nye 1967; Huntington 1968; Scott 1969; Becquart-Leclercq 1989). They suggest that corrupt organizations can deliver results despite lacking sufficient resources, motivated employees, effective laws, and administrative and regulatory support structures. As such, petty corruption is construed as a coping mechanism that makes ordinary citizens' lives bearable in the context of impoverishment and institutional decay. Many studies have reached this conclusion about communist and postcommunist societies (Di Franceisco and Gitelman 1984; Sampson 1987; Grossman 1989; Yang 1994; Ledeneva 1998; Rose 2000; Rivkin-Fish 2005; Polese 2008; Round, Williams and Rodgers 2008b). Based on a series of qualitative interviews with university affiliates in Ukraine, Zaloznaya (2012b) finds that many local students and parents have a positive view of bribery as it allows them to navigate the inflexible higher educational system, receive the treatment that they want, and avoid the burdensome requirements of an outdated curriculum. She also describes similar attitudes among Belarusian parents in relation to bribery in secondary schools: many ordinary Belarusians see as the best way to ensure that their children receive sufficient attention from the teachers (Zaloznaya 2012a). If corruption could indeed offer a coping mechanism that alleviates the hardships of institutional dysfunction, personal engagement in it might be associated with higher levels of support towards incumbent political leadership and the regime it upholds.

Theorists have proposed equally compelling reasons why we should expect--contrary to the two perspectives just noted--that engagement in corruption will sour citizens on their political leaders. Compared to others, people who engage in corruption may conclude that the national economy is performing poorly because the state lacks sufficient economic capacity to ensure the functionality of public agencies and to provide for the livelihoods of public servants.[3] Because people judge incumbent political leaders, the country's political institutions, and the regime broadly by how well the economy is performing,[4] corruption that erodes perceptions of the economy will erode support for the political leadership. A second argument that has been made notes that citizens who give bribes or presents may believe it

---

[3]Both Manzetti and Wilson (2006) and Klašnja and Tucker (2013) find that interactions between *perceptions* of corruption and evaluation of economic performance influence confidence in the political regime. This is a different question than we ask, since we focus on citizens' behavior. We do, however, relate those behaviors to perceptions of elite corruption and of the regime's performance in the multivariate analyses below.

[4]For reviews of the literature on this point, see Weatherford 1984; Finkel, Muller and Seligson 1989; McAllister 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007; regarding Russia, see Treisman 2011, 2014.

drains their resources in a non-trivial way. In their recent study on Slovakia, Klašnja, Tucker, and Deegan-Krause (2014) find a larger than expected role for what they call pocketbook corruption voting.

The third argument comes from the theory of procedural fairness (Tyler 2006). It posits that people will judge the institutions they interact with to be operating fairly (or justly) when the agents of those institutions apply laws and regulations impartially and consistently to everyone who is entitled to a public service (Galbreath and Rose 2008, 53-55). According to this theory, fairness is more important to people than whether policies benefit them (Tyler, Casper and Fisher 1989; Tyler 1990, 2006; Gilley 2009). Procedural justice theory has received support from numerous analyses (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Seligson 2002; Gangl 2003; Kluegel and Mason 2004; Grimes 2006; Gilley 2009). In this perspective, encounters with corrupt officials reveal to ordinary citizens that public institutions are functioning improperly; the rules are being applied dissimilarly (Seligson 2002; Morris and Klesner 2010; Tankebe 2010; Doig 2013).

It might be, of course, that procedural fairness theory performs less well in post-Soviet societies. According to many observers, Weberian procedural legitimacy was weak in the Soviet Union and continues to be weak in many post-Soviet societies (e.g., Pipes 1974; Lovell, Ledeneva and Rogachevskii 2000; Hosking 2003; Hanson 2010). Even so, we should not conclude that post-Soviet citizens place no value on fair treatment from institutions and authorities. The Communist Party's ideology and the social transformations it promoted did impart support for equality of treatment by the state, and that value remains strong in the post-Soviet societies. In addition, survey research shows that large majorities in many post-Soviet states, particularly the European ones such as Russia, hold "modern" (i.e., non-traditional) values such as "secularism, cosmopolitanism, autonomy, and rationality" (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 553).[5]

Patterns of Bureaucratic Corruption in Russia

In June-July 2015, we organized a representative national survey in Russia, which was conducted by the Russian firm of Bashkirova and Partners. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 2,000 respondents. Interviews occurred in 266 sampling points across 52 regions from all eight of the pre-2014

---

[5]At the same time, these societies have comparatively few supporters of postmodern values: "self-expression, participation, subjective well-being, trust, tolerance, and quality of life." In the World Values Surveys from the mid-2000s, Russia is a half of a standard deviation above the mean score for 53 countries on the secular-rational values dimension but 1.5 standard deviations below the mean on self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel 2010, 554).

federal administrative okrugs.[6] With these data, we can empirically tackle the issues of corruption and support for Russia's regime support discussed above. In this section, we present information on the levels of engagement in bureaucratic corruption, both for Russia as a whole and across important geographic and social groups.

We gathered information on respondents' engagement with bureaucratic corruption through a series of questions. We began by asking--with reference to the preceding 12 months--with which of several types of officials they had made contact in order to receive services. We presented and read to the respondents a card on which twelve different types of officials were listed. (They could also indicate some other category, which was recorded. Only 15 people, or .75% of our sample, used this option.) The next question asked how satisfactory they found these experiences. After that, two questions turned to respondents' corruption experiences. The wordings were:

- "Now, please tell me, from the officials with whom you had contact, which ones, if any, asked you for a bribe (extra money), a present, or a favor in exchange for their services?"

(As a shorthand, we refer to being asked by an official for a bribe, gift or favor as "extortion" in the discussion that follows.)

- "Some people say that offering officials additional incentives is the only way to get decent services in contemporary Russia. To which of these officials did you give a bribe (extra money), a present, or do a favor in exchange for a service?"

We have, then, for each respondent a series of responses pertaining to those types of officials with whom they had contact: were they asked (yes-no) and did they give (yes-no)? A person might have neither been asked nor given a bribe, gift or favor in the previous 12 months to officials in any of the bureaucratic spheres. Some, though, had that experience when dealing with one, two or more types of bureaucracies. Note, too, that respondents could indicate that they decided to give a bribe, gift or favor without having been asked. Because of constraints on questionnaire length, we did not ask how many times they did these things with officials of each bureaucracy, only with which bureaucracies one or both sides of the corruption occurred.

Of our 2,000 respondents, a total of 393, or 19.7% of the sample, reported that they had been asked for or given a bribe, gift or favor to at least one type of official over the past year. For a society often described as having pervasive or even ubiquitous corruption, this might seem low. Yet we should expect variety in bureaucratic experiences among a large, diverse populace such as Russia's. Given that

---

[6]The Appendix contains more information on the survey.

our questions refer only to the preceding year, one-fifth is a quite large proportion. To help see whether Russia's proportion is high or low comparatively, we can compare it with results from parallel surveys we conducted, also in 2015, in Ukraine and Georgia. The equivalent proportion in Georgia is 4.7%, making Russia's total seem quite large, although it is lower than in Ukraine, where 26.7% report engaging in bureaucratic corruption over the preceding year. Given Russia's 143.5 million population, our finding implies that almost 29 million Russians participated in corruption as clients of service-provision organizations in the past year. They and other citizens could have also participated in corruption as recipients of unsanctioned compensations in bureaucracies as well as corruptors or corruptees in other types of exchanges.

Moreover, the danger of social desirability bias—our respondents hiding their engagement in petty corruption so as to look better--is likely to be low in Russia. Petty or bureaucratic corruption does not bear the stigma and negative connotations it has in capitalist democracies. Braendle, Gasser and Noo (2005), for instance, argue that in countries where corruption is more commonplace, it is likely to be accepted as part of everyday life. Many studies document the normalization of small-scale corruption in postcommunist countries (Varese 2000; Polese 2008; Rimskii 2013; McMann 2014). In fact, much of qualitative work on the region reveals that ordinary people often openly talk about their involvement in such exchanges and, when they do, they rarely think of petty corruption as crime (Zaloznaya 2012a; Shlapentokh 2013, 155-156). Nonetheless, we took steps to reduce and assess the extent of social desirability leading to biases. All respondents were promised anonymity, and the study was described as focusing on political and economic developments in the country. The questions that asked about corruption were embedded in the series of questions focusing on the quality of interactions with bureaucratic officials. In addition, our questionnaire included a survey experiment designed to estimate the (potentially) more accurate level of those who have given a corrupt incentive to a bureaucrat in the preceding year. It resulted in an estimate of 18%, suggesting those we interviewed had accurately reported their experiences.

In What Organizations Do Russians Engage in Bureaucratic Corruption?

In Figure 1, we break out the patterns of engagement with petty officials and of corruption behaviors by the different bureaucratic spheres. The first bar chart, in the upper left, shows the proportion of our respondents who report encountering each type of official over the past year. The bar chart to its right shows the percent--from among those who encountered that type of official--reporting that the official requested a bribe, present or favor. The bar chart in the lower left reports in what percent of encounters for each organization the person reports having given a bribe, present or favor. Because respondents could

indicate that they offered a bribe, present or favor without having been asked, the final bar chart, in the lower right, shows the number of givers per 100 extortions. Numbers above 100 indicate a sphere in which Russians were inclined to extend something even without being asked while numbers below 100 indicate a sphere in which many felt able to say no when an official asked for a bribe, present or favor.

Looking at the chart, Russians dealt with medical personnel significantly more frequently than with bureaucrats in other spheres over the preceding 12 months. Over two-thirds reported such an encounter, with the next most frequent sphere being housing and communal services at 38%. The third most frequent sphere involved school officials, at 23%, followed closely by traffic police, at 22%. Only local politicians and those who oversee governmental tenders, along with the "other" category, were encountered by less than 10% of the sample. These proportions reflect Russians' patterns of everyday life.

Quite different are the rank orders in the upper right and lower left charts, which indicate corrupt activities. For those who encountered each type of official, the traffic police were the most likely to extort something from them, at 28%. The second-most-common sphere of official extortion (excluding the "other" category) involved university and college officials, at only half the frequency of the traffic police. Inspectors, other police and judicial officials follow, with frequencies of about one in eight encounters.

The traffic police also lead the way in frequency of bribes being paid. University professors and instructors, though only eighth in the number of encounters, take second place with 15% of the encounters involving the citizen extending a bribe, present or favor. While medical officials are the most frequently encountered, they are only tenth in frequency of asking for a corruption incentive yet fourth in frequency of receiving something.

The final column shows the large differences across the spheres in how mandatory Russians feel it is to provide something when asked. When extorted by a member of the traffic police, most Russians pay up, though 10% decline to do so. Those in higher education receive slightly more than they ask for. All the officials in charge of governmental tenders and all local politicians who asked for a bribe received one. One sphere stands out for citizens giving more frequently than they are asked: the medical sphere. The remaining spheres are ones in which many Russians skip providing a bribe, present or favor even when the official indicates that one is expected. When dealing with housing and communal services officials, fewer than half of the demands were met, three-fifths of the occasions when dealing with issuers of certificates or permits and two-thirds of the time when dealing with judicial officials.

Explaining these patterns across organization sectors is beyond the scope of this paper. Clearly, though, petty corruption varies across these sectors in ways that demand further investigation.

Which Russians are More Likely to Engage in Bureaucratic Corruption?

To capture Russians' overall level of engagement with bureaucratic corruption, we created an index variable. For each type of official they had dealt with, we gave respondents a score of: 1 if the official had asked for a bribe/gift/favor but they did not give one; 2 if they were not asked but gave one anyway, 3 if they were asked and gave one; and 0 otherwise. Each step up along this scale indicates involvement in a more corruption-infused situation. We then added respondents' scores across the 13 types of officials. The resulting variable ranges from zero to 19, with an average of .75 and standard deviation of 2.0. As noted above, only 20% have a non-zero score. Of those who were in a corruption situation over the preceding year, the modal value was three (115 respondents, or 5.75%).

Who are the Russians who (willingly or unwillingly) engaged the most in bureaucratic corruption over the preceding year? First, they are more likely to be found in some parts of Russia than others. Figure 2 shows how respondent experiences differ across the eight federal administrative districts into which Russia's regions are divided.[7] The map depicts Russia's pre-2014 regions and the boundaries of the federal districts. Next to each district is indicated the average for the measure of corruption engagement and what percent of respondents living in the district have any engagement at all (a non-zero score on the engagement measure). Corruption is highest in the central and southern districts. It is quite a bit lower in the three federal districts east of 60° longitude as well as in the northwest district, which includes St. Petersburg. Because our sample was not drawn to represent each federal administrative district, we can only treat the clear-cut differences we find as suggestive.

Given our focus on bureaucratic encounters, we should expect higher rates of corruption engagement in urban settings, where bureaucracies tend to be located. We do, indeed, find this pattern. Table 1 uses the same two measures as Figure 2 but breaks them down by size and type of residence. Corruption engagement is higher in cities of various sizes than in the countryside. By grouping cities of different size together, we find that they differ significantly from the rural areas.

Men are more likely to be involved with bureaucratic corruption than women. The average score on our measure of corruption engagement is .89, well above the national average of .75, with women averaging .65. The t-test of the difference in means is 2.72 (.007). Twenty-two percent of the men in our sample had had some engagement over the preceding year, while only 18% of the women had.

Older Russians are less frequently engaged in corruption. Our corruption measure correlates negatively with age at a modest but significant level: -.06 (.007). The drop-off is noticeable at age fifty: the t-

---

[7]On Russia's regions and the federal administrative districts, see Reisinger 2013, xxi-xxv.

test of the difference between those under 50 and those 50 and over is 2.89 (.004). It is stronger yet between those 60-plus and others: the t-test is 3.84 (.000). It is likely that those in the older age groups need to seek services from fewer bureaucracies or are helped by someone younger in those dealings.

Corruption in Russia is more prevalent among the *better* educated. We asked respondents to indicate their highest level of education. We coded their responses into nine categories, from general elementary through post-graduate higher education. Education level correlates with corruption engagement modestly positive: .111 (.000). Figure 3 shows the average scores and the percent having any engagement at each education level. Corruption engagement rises monotonically with education. In particularly, it rises among those with higher education.

The correlation between education and corruption engagement may reflect that the better educated Russians also have higher incomes. All else equal, bribery is easier when one has disposable income. We asked respondents to report the monthly income in rubles of their entire family living with them. As is typical in surveys, a relatively high number declined to answer. Anticipating this non-response, we also asked about income in a different way, which 97% of our respondents were willing to answer. We had them select a statement that best fit their family's situation:

- We do not have enough money even for food.
- We have enough money for food, but it is difficult to buy clothes.
- We have enough money for food and clothes and we can save some amount, but it is not enough to buy expensive things (such as a TV or refrigerator).
- We can afford to buy some expensive things (such as a TV or refrigerator).
- We can afford anything we want.

Although most respondents selected the middle category, many chose the other categories, except for the most wealthy category, which only 16 people, or under 1%, selected. Figure 4 illustrates how our measure of corruption engagement varies across the five income groups. Russia's "one-percenters" are sharply more engaged in corruption than those in less wealthy circumstances. Among the other four groups, the average engagement with corruption varies but not in a monotonic way.

Most of these personal characteristics retain their influence in a multivariate analysis of corruption engagement. Table 2 shows the results of regressing the corruption engagement score on these variables and of a logistic regression showing how each variable influences the odds that someone had been in a corruption situation. For the latter, an odds ratio below one indicates that an increase in the independent variable lowers the odds that the person was involved in corruption. Those above one indicate that higher scores on the independent variable make it more likely. With the exception of higher education, the bivariate relationships discussed above continue to hold in this model. The elderly have significantly lower engagement scores and are much less likely to have any engagement in corruption. The same is true of

women and those living in the countryside. Having a higher education does increase the rate and likeli-

hood of corruption engagement. However, its independent impact in this model that also includes a meas-

ure of family finances falls short of statistical significance. The finances measure has a strong impact,

making corruption engagement more likely. The higher prevalence of corruption in the Central and

Southern districts of the country remains in this multivariate model. This model only explains a low

proportion of the overall variance, shown by an adjusted r-squared of .05 for the regression and a pseudo-

r-squared of .07 for the logistic regression. This model is not meant to explain propensity to engage in

corruption, just to be sure that these demographic characteristics indeed have independent influences. For

a more complete exploration of the influences on individual engagement in corruption, see Zaloznaya,

Claypool and Reisinger 2016.

Patterns of Regime Support in Russia

Our measure of regime support is an index constructed from five questions.[8] Three questions

asked about how well Putin, Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev and United Russia was/were fulfilling

his/their duties.[9] Respondents could choose scores from 1-7, where one was labeled "very poorly," four

was "neutral" and 7 indicated "very well." Two additional questions asked about trust in the overall

political leadership and in the judiciary; responds could choose among fully trust, mostly trust, mostly

distrust or fully distrust.

Figure 5 shows the proportion of the sample choosing supportive responses to each question. For

the trust questions, the overall length of the bar is the sum of the "mostly" and "fully" options. For the

latter three questions, the overall length of the bar is the sum of options 5-7 on the 1-7 scale. Putin is sig-

nificantly popular, with the highest score on our scale indicating the choice of 37% of respondents, a

plurality. Beyond that, though, support is mixed. The plurality response for both Medvedev and United

Russia is four, or "neutral." The patterns for these questions indicate a satisfactory amount of variation in

Russians' support for the regime.

To construct the overall interval-level measure of regime support from these five variables, we

used Stata's alpha command, which first standardized each variable (transformed it so that its mean is at

zero and it has a standard deviation of one), then took the average of the standardized score across the five

---

[8]Table A1 provides summary information on all the measures we employ.

[9]Although this wording could indicate attention to job performance rather than broader-based support for the regime, these questions more probably elicited general reactions. They came early in the questionnaire, prior to questions that asked about leadership performance in specific areas.

variables. The result is a variable that ranges from -2.89 as the least supportive score and 1.52 as the most supportive score. Figure 6 shows the distribution of this variable. The distribution is single-peaked but skewed toward the most-supportive values. Even so, positive and negative scores are close in number: 45% of the respondents fall below zero, and 11% are a standard deviation or more below the mean. How Russians respond to their political leadership does vary.

Political support varies, moreover, in significant ways across Russian social groups.[10] Table 3 shows simple bivariate breakdowns for sex, age, educational attainment, rural or urban residence, religious belief and family finances. Each by itself makes a difference for citizens' level of regime support. Women are more strongly supportive than men. Those aged sixty and above are significantly more supportive than younger citizens. Those with higher education are more supportive, ceteris paribus, than those with lower educations. Rural Russians are significantly more supportive. The most striking dichotomous difference is between those who describe themselves as a religious believer and those who do not. The non-believers have the lowest average level of support of any of the groupings in this table, making the gap between them and believers so large. Finally, Russia's poor are much less supportive and the better off are much more supportive than those in the middle group.

How Experience with Bureaucratic Corruption Influences Regime Support

Given a literature full of plausible but contradictory perspectives, our survey data provide us with a new way to find out whether experience with bureaucratic corruption increases, reduces or does not influence the Russian public's support for its political regime. Previous work on Russia have been unable to link these two at the individual level. With regard to individual corruption experiences drawn from a nationally representative sample, we find an unequivocal answer: those experiences reduce regime support. The direct bivariate relationship is that the higher a person's engagement in corruption over the past year, the lower his or her support for the political regime. The difference in average level of support is .023 for those who had no corruption engagement in the previous year but -.141. for those who did. The t-test of the difference in these two means is 3.761 (.000). Regressing regime support on corruption engagement, without other control variables, produces a coefficient of -.024 with a standard error of .009, which is significant at .005.

We can go beyond the direct effect by showing that corruption engagement alters two of the most powerful influences on regime support: judgments of how corrupt the country's officials are and assess-

---

[10]For a more complete investigation of the influences on support for the political regime, see Reisinger, Zaloznaya and Claypool 2016.

ments of the job that the political leadership is doing. Figure 7 shows the hypothesized relationships among the key variables. We proceed by showing the influence of corruption engagement on perceptions of elite corruption as well as on views of the leadership's performance (the blue arrows in the figure). We then show how those two factors influence regime support (the red arrows).

To measure perceptions of official corruption, we created an index measure composed from three questions which asked how many national, regional and local leaders are corrupt: hardly any, not very many, many, or almost all. Table 4 shows the results from regressing this index on corruption engagement. We include a measure of an important political value influencing views of official corruption: respect for the law. This measure combines responses to two agree-disagree statements. The first one indicates that it is sometimes okay to disobey a law that interferes with citizens' ability to resolve their problems. The other states that it makes no sense to obey the laws when the authorities are not doing so. For both statements, disagreement signified more respect for the rule of law. We also include two demographic controls: whether the respondent is female and whether he or she lives in a rural area.

We find that, whether using the corruption index or the dummy variable signifying any corruption experience, engagement in bureaucratic corruption significantly raise perceptions of official corruption. In other words, Russians are extrapolating from their experiences with street-level bureaucrats to reach conclusions about the political leaders who govern them. In Russians' eyes, corrupted bureaucrats are representatives of the system for which they work.[11] Russians with high respect for the law tend to perceive less corruption among political leaders, as do both female and rural residents.

The second mechanism through which corruption engagement degrades regime support involves how people assess the job the country's political leadership is doing. The measure of performance we use is broad-based, covering the state of the economy, fighting corruption, rights protection, crime reduction, national security and standing in the world. We construct a single index measure from eight intercorrelated questions tapping these concerns. We find that Russians' views of the leadership's performance are strongly influenced by the kinds of experiences they have when dealing with petty bureaucrats.[12] The more satisfied citizens are with their bureaucratic encounters, the more highly they rate the job the leader-

---

[11]Not all of the organizational sectors we asked respondents about are state agencies. They are all treated, evidently, as being linked with the governing regime.

[12]As discussed above, after asking whether respondents had contact with each type of official and prior to mentioning bribes, gifts or favors, we asked whether that experience was satisfactory, somewhat satisfactory, somewhat unsatisfactory or very unsatisfactory. We used the row mean of the resulting 13 variables.

ship is doing. And, the two strongest influences on satisfaction with bureaucratic encounters are the state of one's finances and whether the encounters entailed corruption.

Table 5 presents analyses supporting these two links: between corruption and dissatisfaction as well as between dissatisfaction and the assessment of the leadership's performance. The top portion of the table shows that an important determinant of whether people came away from their official encounters satisfied or unsatisfied is whether the encounter turned into a corruption situation: either the official extended a request for a bribe/gift/favor or the person felt the need to offer one. Our measure of engagement with corruption has a strong and significant negative impact on the measure of satisfaction with official encounters in a regression that includes six demographic controls. As a bivariate relationship, the t-test of the difference in mean satisfaction between those who had some corruption in the past year and those who did not is 7.46 (.000). The lower portion of the table presents the results from an instrumental variables regression in which corruption engagement influences evaluations of the encounters and those evaluations enter the model of performance assessment, along with controls for sex and financial situation. The higher the satisfaction with official encounters, controlling for corruption engagement, the higher the assessment of how the country's political leaders are performing. Note that men and women have no significant difference in how they assess leadership performance in the second stage of the instrumental-variables regression, which controls for their different levels of corruption engagement. Everyday encounters with officialdom do create impressions that influence more broad-based political judgments. Corruption makes those impressions negative.

Finally, Table 6 verifies that corruption engagement does damage to the public's support for the political regime by pushing up perceptions of official corruption and pushing down assessments of the leadership's performance. Our model includes the political value of support for democratic values (those more supportive of democracy are less supportive of Russia's current regime) and several demographic controls.[13] Russians who perceive higher levels of official corruption express significantly lower support for Russia's political regime. Those who view the leadership's performance positively express strongly higher regime support. These results emerge even when we control for ideology, income and several demographic factors.

---

[13]Our measure of support for democracy is an index of responses to seven questions. Two of the questions ask for a reaction to the word democracy, while the remaining five ask about features of a democratic system without mentioning democracy.

Conclusion

We employed data from a nationally representative survey in Russia in 2015 to explore patterns of bureaucratic, or everyday, street-level corruption and the implications those patterns have for the public's views of their political leaders. How often Russians engage in bureaucratic corruption varies significantly along numerous cleavages. It varies among the types of service-providing organizations that citizens encounter. This variance includes how often bureaucrats seek a bribe, gift or favor and how often the citizen feels the need to provide it, but also how often the citizen provides something without being asked. Corruption engagement is more frequent in some parts of the country. Moscow and the regions around it lead the way, but St. Petersburg and the other regions in the Northwest Federal District lag behind. It is more frequent in cities than in rural settings and more common among men, those below 60 in age, the better educated and the financially secure. Public support for Russia's political regime is overall high, particularly Putin's rating, but it does vary. We show that women, the elderly, the better educated, the financially better off and rural Russians all tend to evince higher support, as do those who describe themselves as religious believers.

Having found those patterns of regime support and corruption engagement, we turned to the paper's primary question: does everyday corruption affect how Russians view their political leadership? Yes, it does: being involved in corrupt transactions reduces support for the regime by making the political leadership's performance seem worse and by heightening perceptions that corruption is widespread among the country's leaders. We find no support for arguments in the literature that bribery and other forms of bureaucratic corruption help citizens pursue their needs in the face of inefficient state institutions and less developed economies. In Russia, those who frequently encounter corruption are less, not more, happy with the regime. The effect on the regime's public support is not, of course, immediate or over-whelming. Effective messaging, the charisma of the country's leader and much else goes into how Russians respond to the current political regime. Nonetheless, street-level corruption is corrosive of the body politic. Our results, thus, are an important step towards resolving a long-standing debate among those who study corruption.

Our findings also bear on the sources of stability for authoritarian regimes. As Gerschewski (2013) has argued, these regimes deploy different combinations of strategies aimed at repression, elite cooptation and mass legitimacy. We show that, in Russia, extensive low-level corruption undermines the latter. Moreover, a common strategy for elite cooptation is to allow them to profit through corrupt transactions (Darden 2008; Chang and Golden 2010; Gerschewski 2013). If tacit approval of corruption by high elites leads to similar tacit approval at lower levels (or the continuation of such behavior), a regime may find

that what it gains in support from lower-level elites it loses in support from the public. It faces a tension between two legs of the triad of regime-maintenance strategies. Over the medium run, Russia's leadership has strong reasons why it should implement serious measures to reduce the prevalence of street-level corruption. That may be impossible in the short run, though.

Appendix

The survey was conducted in June and July, 2015. 2,000 respondents came from 52 regions located in all of the eight federal administrative districts existing prior to the annexation of Crimea, in the following proportions:

Federal Administrative District	Number of Regions	Number of Interviews	Proportion
Central	11	541	27.1%
Northwestern	4	192	9.6%
Southern	5	197	9.9%
North Caucasus	3	128	6.4%
Volga	13	415	20.8%
Urals	4	172	8.6%
Siberian	9	268	13.4%
Far Eastern	3	87	4.4%
Total:	52	2,000	100%

Sampling Information

Stratification
In drawing the population sample, probability sampling was employed using stratification criteria. The adult population of the country was divided based on regional variation, and within each division, a pro-portionately balanced random sample was drawn, making sure that more remote provinces and rural areas, with more traditional lifestyles, were included in the sample.

Selection of Primary Sampling Units
The 155 primary sampling units (PSU) were selected from within strata proportional to population size of the strata. The number of respondents per PSU depends on its size.

Selection of Secondary Sampling Units
Within each PSU, a certain number of secondary sampling units (SSUs) were chosen randomly. The number of interviews per SSU did not exceed 10.

Selection of households and interviewees
Interviewers hired by Bashkirova and Partners were provided with maps showing the locations where the pre-determined number of interviews were to be conducted. Within these locations, the random route pro-cedure was used to identify residences where interviews would be conducted. These locations were pre-selected as part of the sampling process.

Citizen subjects were approached by knocking on the door of the residence selected through the multi-stage sampling method. If no-one was at home, the interviewer moved to the next pre-selected household. In each household, only one person was interviewed. To identify the person to be interviewed, interviewers attempted to complete a brief screening interview at the selected household. Screening ques-tions assured labor-force and non-labor-force representation as well as respondents from different eco-

nomic sectors. During the screening interview, interviewers made a list of each age-eligible person resid-ing at the household. After completing this household listing, one eligible person was randomly selected from the list. The interview was conducted only with the selected person; no substitutions were allowed.

If the selected person was present, they were read the consent form. If the person consented, the interview began and the interview was assigned a code number. If the person declined, the interviewer recorded this information and moved to the next randomly selected household. If the selected person was not present, the interviewer asked when this person would be there and recorded this information on their contact sheet for a second visit. If the selected respondent refused to participate, or if no interview could be secured in a selected household after three attempts, the interviewer moved on to another randomly selected household.

After the consent form was read, and if the selected person agreed to participate, the interview was conducted with the selected person in their home. Respondents could elect the location in their residence where they would be afforded the highest possible privacy level for their interview. If other family mem-bers or friends were present in the household, they might be asked to leave, if the interviewee preferred this level of privacy. If the household was such that an adequate level of privacy could not be obtained, the interview would not take place, and another potential respondent from a different household was ran-domly selected.

Table A1: Summary Information on Key Variables

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Political support	1,996	-0.009	0.774	-2.891	1.523
Assessment of leadership performance	1,998	0.009	0.658	-1.665	1.960
Extent of elite corruption	1,805	-0.027	0.923	-2.014	1.502
Evaluations of encounters with bureaucrats	1,649	2.905	0.781	1	4
Engagement in corruption	2,000	0.752	2.005	0	19
Democratic values	2,000	-0.003	0.516	-1.530	1.994
Respect for the law	1,943	-0.001	0.868	-1.652	1.806
Age	2,000	43.767	16.107	18	92
Female?	2,000	0.579	0.494	0	1
Higher education?	1,997	0.333	0.471	0	1
Rural?	2,000	0.250	0.433	0	1
Believer?	2,000	0.746	0.436	0	1
Family finances	1,947	3.010	0.763	1	5

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

Wording of Questions Used to Construct Index Variables

Political support [Cronbach's alpha = .82]
Now we want to get your opinion of how certain people or organizations are fulfilling their duties. To find this out, we will use a seven point scale, where 1 indicates "very poorly", 7 indicates "very well" and 4 is "neutral". You may use any number between 1 and 7 to tell me how well or poorly each is doing.
- President - Putin, V.V.
- Prime Minister - Medvedev, D.A.
- Members of the party "United Russia"

People have different ideas about the political leadership of Russia. In this question, we do not mean the ideas about any person in particular, but about leadership in general. Please tell me, how much do you trust the political leadership of Russia – you trust it fully, you trust it mostly, mostly you don't trust it, or you don't trust it at all?

Please tell me, how much do you trust the judicial powers in Russia: you trust them fully, you trust them mostly, mostly you don't trust them, or you don't trust them at all ?

Leadership performance [Cronbach's alpha = .81]
Do you think the current state of Russia's economy is Very Good, Rather Good, Rather Bad, or Very Bad?

Talking about the state of the country's economy in general, how do you think it has changed over the past twelve months? Has the state of the economy in Russia become Much Better, Somewhat Better, Somewhat Worse, or Much Worse?

Now I will read you several tasks. For each task I read, please tell me if Russia's political leadership is Very Successful, Mostly Successful, Mostly Unsuccessful or Very Unsuccessful.
- Strengthening the economy
- Dealing with threats to Russia's national security
- Combatting crime
- Protecting citizens' human rights
- Fighting corruption
- Strengthening Russia's standing in the world

Elite Corruption [Cronbach's alpha = .89]
For each of the groups I will now read, we want to know how many of these people are corrupt: Almost all are corrupt, many are corrupt, not very many are corrupt or hardly any are corrupt?
- Our country's leadership
- Your region's leadership
- Your local leadership

Evaluation of bureaucratic encounters
[Referring to those bureaucrats with whom they had had contact over the preceding 12 months:] On the whole, how were your personal experiences of dealing with these officials over the past year: Satisfactory, Somewhat Satisfactory, Somewhat Unsatisfactory or Very Unsatisfactory? [The variable used is the row mean of responses to the 13 possible types of bureaucrats encountered.]

*Democratic values [Cronbach's alpha = .51]*
Which political system, in your opinion, would be best for Russia: the Soviet system as it was before Perestroika, the political system that exists today, or a Western-style democracy?

I will read out several statements. For each one, please tell me whether you absolutely agree with the statement, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or absolutely disagree with the statement.
- Our political system is stronger when candidates from more than one party have a realistic chance to win an election.
- Any individual or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any governmental initiative.
- It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they become disruptive.
- Democratic freedoms are more important than strong leadership for Russia right now.
- Right now Russia needs strong leadership more than democracy.
- Democracy has its problems but it is better than any other form of government.

Figures and Tables

FIGURE 1: BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, FREQUENCY BY ORGANIZATION [return to text]

N = 2,000

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

FIGURE 2:   ENGAGEMENT IN BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, BY FEDERAL DISTRICT [return to text]


The first number for each federal administrative district is the average corruption engagement score among respondents living in that district. The second number is the percent of those respondents having any corruption engagement.

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

TABLE 1:   ENGAGEMENT IN BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, BY SIZE AND TYPE OF RESIDENCE
[return to text]

| Respondent's Residence	Average Corruption Engagement	Percent Having Any Engagement
Overall	.75	20%
Cities of over 1 million	.73	23%
Cities from 500,000-999,999	.77	21%
Cities from 100,000-499,999	1.05	25%
Cities under 100,000	.79	18%
Rural areas	.49	13%
T-test of difference between urban and rural	3.43 (.001)	4.47 (.000)

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

FIGURE 3: ENGAGEMENT IN BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION [return to text]

T-test, difference in engagement score between those with and without higher education: -3.88 (.000)
T-test, difference in whether has engaged between those with and without higher education: -4.09 (.000)

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

FIGURE 4: ENGAGEMENT IN BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, BY FAMILY FINANCES [return to text]


Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

TABLE 2:   MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF ENGAGEMENT IN BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION [return to text]

|	Level of Corruption Engagement		Whether Had Any Engagement or Not
	Coefficient (std. error)	Beta Weight	Odds Ratio (std. error)
Sixty or over?	-.294** (.114)	-.06	.53** (.093)
Female?	-.234* (.092)	-.06	.79* (.094)
Rural?	-.258* (.105)	-.06	.57** (.089)
Higher education?	.188 (.099)	.04	1.21 (.150)
Family Finances	.181** (.062)	.07	1.42** (.120)
Lives in the Central Federal District	.665** (.104)	.15	2.11** (.274)
Lives in the Southern Federal District	.611** (.154)	.09	2.70** (.492)
Constant	.178 (.208)		.08** (.023)
Adj. R-squared:	.05		.07

* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01 or lower.
N = 1,944

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

FIGURE 5: LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR PUTIN'S REGIME [return to text]

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

FIGURE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF REGIME SUPPORT [return to text]

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

TABLE 3:   REGIME SUPPORT BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS [return to text]

	Categories	N	Mean	T-test
Sex	Male	842	-.129	-5.941 (.000)
	Female	1,158	.078	
Age	18-30	522	-.008	-.045 (.964)
	31-59	1,055	-.038	
	60+	423	.062	-2.137 (.033)
Higher Education?	No	1,332	-.035	-2.104 (.036)
	Yes	665	.042	
Residence	Rural	500	.056	-2.191 (.029)
	Urban	1,500	-.031	
Believer	No	509	-.220	-7.172 (.000)
	Yes	1,491	.062	
Family Finances	Poor	421	-.184	5.241 (.000)
	Modest	1,042	.022	
	Middle/Upper	484	.085	-3.076 (.002)

Note: For the variables with three categories, the t-tests refer to the difference between the category it is next to and the other two combined.

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

FIGURE 7: CORRUPTION ENGAGEMENT'S INDIRECT LINKS TO REGIME SUPPORT [return to text]

TABLE 4:   THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ENGAGEMENT ON PERCEPTIONS OF OFFICIAL CORRUPTION
[return to text]

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient (std. error)	Beta Weight	Coefficient (std. error)	Beta Weight
Corruption Engagement	.049** (.010)	.11		
Any Corruption Engagement?			.292** (.053)	.13
Respect for the Law	-.167** (.025)	-.16	-.165** (.025)	-.16
Female?	-.124** (.043)	-.07	-.124** (.043)	-.07
Rural?	-.130** (.050)	-.06	-.120* (.050)	-.06
Constant	.042 (.036)		.017 (.037)	
Adj. R-squared:	.05		.05	

* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01 or lower.
N = 1,763

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

TABLE 5:   THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ENGAGEMENT ON ASSESSMENTS OF LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE
[return to text]

Dependent variable: evaluation of encounters with bureaucrats	Coefficient (std. error)	Beta Weight
Corruption Engagement	-.057** (.008)	-.16
Age	-.005** (.001)	-.11
Female?	.103** (.039)	.06
Higher Education?	.102* (.040)	.06
Rural?	.046 (.045)	.02
Believer?	.049 (.045)	.03
Family Finances	.199** (.026)	.19
Constant	2.427** (.110)	
Adj. R-squared:	.08	

Dependent variable: perceptions of leadership performance (two-stage least squares)	Coefficient (std. error)
Encounters with bureaucrats	.221* (.103)
Female?	.042 (.035)
Family Finances	.079** (.030)
Constant	-.864** (.234)
Adj. R-squared:	.09

* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01 or lower.
N = 1,605

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

TABLE 6:   REGIME SUPPORT REGRESSED ON PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE AND OFFICIAL CORRUPTION [return to text]

	Coefficient (std. error)	Beta Weight
Extent of Official Corruption	-.164** (.024)	-.19
Assessment of Leadership Performance	.484** (.024)	.41
Democratic Values	-.090** (.031)	-.06
Female?	.101** (.033)	.06
Rural?	.076* (.036)	.04
Religious Believer?	.207** (.038)	.12
Family Finances	.088** (.021)	.09
Constant	-.530** (.074)	
Adj. R-squared:	.29	

* = significant at .05; ** = significant at .01 or lower.
N = 1,754

Source: Reisinger, Claypool and Zaloznaya 2015.

References

Babayan, Nelli. 2015. "The Return of the Empire? Russia's Counteraction to Transatlantic Democracy Promotion in its Near Abroad," *Democratization* 22 #3 (June), 438-458.

Baturo, Alexander and Johan A. Elkink. 2016. "Dynamics of Regime Personalization and Patron–Client Networks in Russia, 1999–2014," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32 #1, 75-98.

Becquart-Leclercq, Jeanne. 1989. "Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, et al., eds., *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction), 191-210.

Braendle, Udo C., Tanja Gasser and Juergen Noll. 2005. "Corporate Governance in China—Is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?," *Business and Society Review* 110 #4 (December), 389-405, accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0045-3609.2005.00022.x.

Brooker, Paul. 2013. *Non-Democratic Regimes*, third edition (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan).

Chaisty, Paul and Stephen Whitefield. 2013. "Forward to Democracy or Back to Authoritarianism? The Attitudinal Bases of Mass Support for the Russian Election Protests of 2011–2012," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 29 #5 (September), 387-403.

Chang, Eric and Miriam A. Golden. 2010. "Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes," *Social Science Quarterly* 91 #1, 1-20.

Chong, Alberto, et al. 2011. "Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes," *NBER Working Paper* #17679 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research), accessed at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17679.pdf.

Darden, Keith. 2008. "The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution," *Politics & Society* 36 #1 (March), 35-59.

Di Franceisco, Wayne and Zvi Gitelman. 1984. "Soviet Political Culture and 'Covert Participation' in Policy Implementation," *American Political Science Review* 78 #3 (September), 603-621.

Dincer, Oguzhan C. and Burak Gunalp. 2012. "Corruption and Income Inequality in the United States," *Contemporary Economic Policy* 30 #2 (April), 283-292.

Doig, Alan. 2013. "In the State We Trust? Democratisation, Corruption, and Development," in Alan Doig and Robin Theobald, eds., *Corruption and Democratisation*, second edition (London: Frank Cass), 13-37.

Easton, David. 1965. *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall).

Finkel, Steven E., Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1989. "Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica," *British Journal of Political Science* 19 #3 (July), 329-351.

Freedom House. 2015. *Freedom in the World 2015: Discarding Democracy: Return to the Iron Fist* (Washington, DC: Freedom House), accessed at http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.

Frye, Timothy, et al. 2015. "Is Putin's Popularity Real?," unpublished manuscript (November 17), accessed at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2692049.

Gaaze, Konstantin. 2014. "Poker dlya Odnogo: Kto i Kak v Rossii Prinimaet Resheniia, Kotorye Opredeliaiut Sud'bu 140-Millionnoi Strany," [Poker for One: Who and How in Russia Decisions are Taken That Determine the Fate of the Country's 140 Million People] *Novoe Vremya*, accessed at http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/86540, on September 5, 2014.

Galbreath, David J. and Richard Rose. 2008. "Fair Treatment in a Divided Society: A Bottom-up Assessment of Bureaucratic Encounters in Latvia," *Governance* 21 #1 (January), 53-73.

Gangl, Amy. 2003. "Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process," *Political Behavior* 25 #2 (June), 119-149.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12 #2 (June), 313-331.

Gelman, Vladimir. 2014. "The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 22 #4, 503-522.

Gerber, Theodore P. and Sarah E. Mendelson. 2008. "Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing?," *Law & Society Review* 42 #1 (March), 1-44.

Gerschewski, Johannes. 2013. "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes," *Democratization* 20 #1 (January), 13-38.

Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy* (New York: Columbia University Press).

Glaeser, Edward, Jose Scheinkman and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. "The Injustice of Inequality," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50 #1 (January), 199-222.

Grimes, Marcia. 2006. "Organizing Consent: The Role of Procedural Fairness in Political Trust and Compliance," *European Journal of Political Research* 45 #2 (March), 285-315.

Grossman, Gregory. 1989. "The Second Economy: Boon or Bane for the Reform of the First Economy?," in Stanislaw Gomulka, et al., eds., *Economic Reforms in the Socialist World* (New York: M.E. Sharpe), 79–97.

Hanson, Stephen E. 2010. *Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

_____. 2011. "Plebiscitarian Patrimonialism in Putin's Russia: Legitimating Authoritarianism in a Postideological Era," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 636 #1 (July), 32-48.

Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann. 2000. "Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition," *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* #2444 (September), pre-publication version, accessed at Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=240555.

Hibbing, John R. and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Holmes, Stephen. 2006. "Conclusion: The State of the State in Putin's Russia," in Timothy J. Colton and Stephen Holmes, eds., *The State After Communism: Governance in the New Russia* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield), 299-310.

Hosking, Geoffrey. 2003. "The State and Identity Formation in Russia: A Historical Account," in Katlijn Malfliet and Francisca Scharpe, eds., *The Concept of Russia: Patterns for Political Development in the Russian Federation* (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press), 21-33.

Humphrey, Caroline. 2000. "Rethinking Bribery in Contemporary Russia," in Stephen Lovell, et al., eds., *Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 216-241.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press).

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2010. "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy," *Perspectives on Politics* 8 #2 (June), 551-567.

Jain, Arvind K. 2001. "Corruption: A Review," *Journal of Economic Surveys* 15 #1 (February), 71-121.

Jong-Sung, You and Sanjeev Khagram. 2005. "A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption," *American Sociological Review* 70 #1 (February), 136-157.

Karklins, Rasma. 2005. *The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Postcommunist Societies* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe).

Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: A. A. Knopf).

Klašnja, Marko and Joshua A. Tucker. 2013. "The Economy, Corruption, and the Vote: Evidence from Experiments in Sweden and Moldova," *Electoral Studies* 32 #3 (September), 536-543.

Klašnja, Marko, Joshua A. Tucker and Kevin Deegan-Krause. 2014. "Pocketbook vs. Sociotropic Corruption Voting," *British Journal of Political Science* (June), pre-publication version, accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000088.

Kluegel, James R. and David S. Mason. 2004. "Fairness Matters: Social Justice and Political Legitimacy in Post-Communist Europe," *Europe-Asia Studies* 56 #6 (September), 813-834.

Laruelle, Marlene. 2014. "Beyond Anti-Westernism: The Kremlin's Narrative about Russia's European Identity and Mission," *PONARS Policy Memo* #326 (Washington, DC: PONARS Eurasia, August), accessed at http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/beyond-anti-westernism-kremlin%E2%80%99s-narrative-about-russia%E2%80%99s-european-identity-and-mission.

_____. 2016. "The Three Colors of Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32 #1, 55-74.

Ledeneva, Alena V. 1998. *Russia's Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Mary Stegmaier. 2007. "Economic Models of Voting," in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior* (New York: Oxford University Press), 518-537.

Linde, Jonas. 2012. "Why Feed the Hand that Bites You? Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and System Support in Post-Communist Democracies," *European Journal of Political Research* 51 #3 (May), 410-434.

Lovell, Stephen, Alena V. Ledeneva and A.B. Rogachevskii, eds. 2000. *Bribery and Blat in Russia: Negotiating Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s* (New York: St. Martins Press).

Manzetti, Luigi and Carole J. Wilson. 2006. "Corruption, Economic Satisfaction and Confidence in Government: Evidence from Argentina," *The Latin Americanist* 49 #2 (March), 131-139.

McAllister, Ian. 1999. "The Economic Performance of Governments," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (New York: Oxford University Press), 188-203.

McCarthy, Lauren, Timothy Frye and Noah Buckley. 2015. "A Rotten Orchard? Societal Tolerance of Police Misbehavior in Moscow, Russia," unpublished manuscript (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, Amherst).

McMann, Kelly. 2014. *Corruption as a Last Resort: Adapting to the Market in Central Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Melville, Andrei and Mikhail Mironyuk. 2015. ""Bad Enough Governance": State Capacity and Quality of Institutions in Post-Soviet Autocracies," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, pre-publication version, accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1052215.

Miller, William L., Ase B. Grødeland and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina. 2001. *A Culture of Corruption? Coping With Government in Post-Communist Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press).

Morris, Stephen D. and Joseph L. Klesner. 2010. "Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence From Mexico," *Comparative Political Studies* 43 #10 (October), 1258-1285.

Nadeau, Richard, Richard Niemi and Antoine Yoshinaka. 2002. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context Across Time and Nations," *Electoral Studies* 21 #3 (September), 403-423.

Norris, Pippa. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Nye, J. S. 1967. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 61 #2 (June), 417-427.

Osipian, Ararat L. 2007. "Corruption in Higher Education: Conceptual Approaches and Measurement Techniques," *Research in Comparative and International Education* 2 #4, 313-332.

_____. 2008. "Political Graft and Education Corruption in Ukraine: Compliance, Collusion, and Control," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 16 #4, 323-344.

_____. 2009. "Corruption Hierarchies in Higher Education in the Former Soviet Bloc," *International Journal of Educational Development* 29 #3, 321-330.

_____. 2012. "Education Corruption, Reform, and Growth: Case of Post-Soviet Russia," *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 3 #1 (January), 20-29.

Pipes, Richard. 1974. *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner's).

Polese, Abel. 2008. "'If I receive it, it is a gift; if I demand it, then it is a bribe': On the Local Meaning of Economic Transactions in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Anthropology in Action* 15 #3 (Winter), 47-60.

Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. and Guy D. Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37 #2 (May), 391-414.

Reisinger, William M., ed. 2013. *Russia's Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics* (New York: Routledge).

Reisinger, William M., Vicki L. Hesli Claypool and Marina Zaloznaya. 2015. *Surveys on Political Causes and Consequences of Bureaucratic Corruption in the Post-Soviet Region* (Iowa City, IA, June-July 2015).

Reisinger, William M., Marina Zaloznaya and Vicki L. Hesli Claypool. 2016. "Everyday Corruption and Regime Support in Russia and Ukraine," unpublished manuscript.

Rimskii, Vladimir. 2013. "Bribery as a Norm for Citizens Settling Problems in Government and Budget-Funded Organizations," *Russian Politics & Law* 51 #4 (July/August), 8-24.

Rivkin-Fish, Michele. 2005. "Bribes, Gifts and Unofficial Payments: Rethinking Corruption in Post-Soviet Russian Health Care," in Dieter Haller and Cris Shore, eds., *Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto), 47-64.

Roberts, Sean P. 2012. *Putin's United Russia Party* (New York: Routledge).

Rose, Richard. 2000. "Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-Modern and Anti-Modern," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 16 #1 (January-March), 33-57.

Rose, Richard, William Mishler and Neil Munro. 2011. *Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Round, John, Colin C. Williams and Peter Rodgers. 2008a. "Corruption in the Post-Soviet Workplace: The Experiences of Recent Graduates in Contemporary Ukraine," *Work, Employment & Society* 22 #1 (March), 149-166.

_____. 2008b. "Everyday Tactics and Spaces of Power: The Role of Informal Economies in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Social & Cultural Geography* 9 #2 (March), 171-185.

Sampson, Steven L. 1987. "The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 493 (September), 120-136.

Scott, James C. 1969. "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 69 #4 (December), 1142-1158.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries," *The Journal of Politics* 64 #2 (May), 408-433.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 2011. "The Puzzle of Russian Anti-Americanism: From 'Below' or From 'Above'," *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 #5 (July), 875-889.

_____. 2013. "Corruption, the Power of State and Big Business in Soviet and Post-Soviet regimes," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 46 #1 (March), 147-158.

Tankebe, Justice. 2010. "Public Confidence in the Police: Testing the Effects of Public Experiences of Police Corruption in Ghana," *British Journal of Criminology* 50 #2 (March), 296-319.

Tavits, Margit. 2010. "Why Do People Engage in Corruption? The Case of Estonia," *Social Forces* 88 #3 (March), 1257-1279.

Treisman, Daniel. 2011. "Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin," *American Journal of Political Science* 55 #3 (July), 590-609.

_____. 2014. "Putin's Popularity Since 2010: Why did Support for the Kremlin Plunge, Then Stabilize?," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 30 #5, 370-388.

Tyler, Tom R. 1990. *Why People Obey the Law* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

_____. 2006. "Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation," *Annual Review of Psychology* 57 #1, 375-400.

Tyler, Tom R., Jonathan D. Casper and Bonnie Fisher. 1989. "Maintaining Allegiance toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures," *American Journal of Political Science* 33 #3 (August), 629-652.

Varese, Frederico. 2000. "Pervasive Corruption," in Alena Ledeneva and Marina Kurkchiyan, eds., *Economic Crime in Russia* (London: Kluwer Law International), 99-111.

Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1984. "Economic 'Stagflation' and Public Support for the Political System," *British Journal of Political Science* 14 #2 (April), 187-205.

Whitten, Guy D. and Harvey D. Palmer. 1998. "Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting," *Electoral Studies* 18 #1 (March), 19-67.

Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui. 1994. *Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

Zaloznaya, Marina. 2012a. *Bureaucratic Corruption in Transitional Economies: Political Regimes, Organizations, and Informality in Ukraine and Belarus.* Ph.D. thesis from the Department of Sociology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, August).

_____. 2012b. "Organizational Cultures as Agents of Differential Association: Explaining the Variation in Bribery Practices in Ukrainian Universities," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 58 #3 (October), 295-320.

Zaloznaya, Marina, Vicki L. Hesli Claypool and William M. Reisinger. 2016. "Street-Collar Crime: How Culture, Opportunity, and Utility Shape Citizen Participation in Bureaucratic Bribery," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Seattle, August.